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Case No. 900288-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from convictions of possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute (methamphetamine 
and marijuana), second and third degree felonies, under Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1992), and possession of a 
controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree felony, under Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1992). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court 
correctly ruled that evidence seized pursuant to defendant's 
voluntary consent to search was admissible, even though the 
consent followed an illegal roadblock stop. 
The trial court's ruling is reviewed for correctness. 
State v. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 26 (Utah Jan. 7, 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, 
statutes, or rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues 
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with one count of 
possession of a controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree 
felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1992), and 
two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute, second and third degree felonies, under Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1992) (R. 150-51). 
After the trial court denied defendant's motion to 
suppress, based on its conclusion that the roadblock stop of his 
car was lawful and defendant had consented to a search of the car 
(see Ruling, R. 55-58; attached as Appendix A), a jury found 
defendant guilty as charged (R. 26, 55-58, 88-131, 197-99). The 
court sentenced defendant to a term of not less than one nor more 
than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison for the second degree 
felony, and prison terms not to exceed five years for the two 
third degree felonies, all terms to run concurrently (R. 261). 
The court then stayed execution of the sentence pending 
defendant's completion of a previously imposed sentence in 
Montana (R. 269). 
Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court should 
have granted his motion to suppress because the roadblock stop 
2 
violated the Fourth Amendment,1 This Court affirmed in an 
unpublished opinion. State v. Shoulderblade, No. 900228-CA (Utah 
App. Mar. 12, 1992) (unpublished) (attached as Appendix B). The 
Court held that, although the roadblock stop was 
unconstitutional, defendant had not presented a basis for 
reversal because he did not challenge the trial court's ruling 
that the incriminating evidence had been seized pursuant to 
defendant's voluntary consent to a search of the car. j[d, at 3-
4. Nor had he made a nonattenuation argument under State v. 
Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). Id. at 3. Compare State v. 
Small, 829 P.2d 129, 131-32 (Utah App.) (where defendant's 
codefendant raised the nonattenuation argument and obtained a 
reversal), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). 
With new counsel, defendant filed a petition for 
certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court. He argued that certiorari 
should be granted to review his claims of plain error and 
ineffective assistance of counsel concerning this Court's refusal 
to address the attenuation issue and former counsel's failure to 
raise it. The State agreed with defendant's ineffectiveness 
claim, and, pursuant to defendant's motion for summary 
disposition, the supreme court reversed and remanded the case to 
this Court for consideration of the attenuation issue. State v. 
Shoulderblade, No. 920239, Order (Utah Jan. 5, 1993) (attached as 
1
 Although defendant was tried jointly with a codefendant, 
Lemuel Small, defendants elected to take separate appeals. See 
State v. Small, 829 P.2d 129 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 
1042 (Utah 1992). 
3 
Appendix C). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This Court summarized the facts of this case in its 
prior opinion: 
On September 29, 1988, the Utah Highway 
Patrol, in conjunction with the Millard 
County Sheriff's office, conducted a 
roadblock in Millard County, Utah, on a 
section of Interstate 15. Approximately 
fifteen officers were assigned to operate the 
roadblock. They were instructed to check for 
driver's licenses and vehicle registration. 
In addition, the officers were told to 
further question any one who looked 
suspicious. 
During the roadblock, all vehicles were 
stopped, including the vehicle Shoulderblade 
was driving. Lemuel Small was a passenger in 
that vehicle. Officer Jeffrey Whatcott, who 
executed the stop, testified that both Small 
and Shoulderblade produced valid 
identification. The vehicle was not 
registered to either Small or Shoulderblade. 
Small told the officer that the vehicle 
belonged to a friend of his. The officer 
sought confirmation of registration through 
radio dispatch. He also asked Small and 
Shoulderblade if there were any firearms, 
alcohol, or drugs in the vehicle. Both 
replied in the negative. Officer Whatcott 
then requested permission to search the 
vehicle. Small consented. Both Small and 
Shoulderblade were arrested after a 
substantial quantity of drugs, drug 
paraphernalia, firearms, and cash was found 
in the vehicle. Officer Whatcott continued 
to search the vehicle, and upon smelling 
marijuana, opened the trunk of the vehicle 
and discovered more drugs and paraphernalia. 
State v. Shoulderblade, Case No. 900288-CA, slip op. at 1-2 (Utah 
App. Mar. 12, 1992) (unpublished). See also State v. Small, 829 
P.2d 129, 130 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 
1992). 
4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant does not challenge the voluntariness of the 
consent he gave for a police search of his car after he had been 
stopped at an illegal roadblock. Instead, he argues that his 
consent was not sufficiently attenuated from the illegal stop to 
be valid under the exploitation prong of the two-part test 
adopted in State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). 
Defendant's argument does not fully consider the 
clarification of Arroyo's exploitation prong the supreme court 
recently set forth in State v. Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 
(Utah Jan. 7, 1993). There, the court made clear that Arroyo's 
primary goal was deterrence of police misconduct, and that the 
relative egregiousness of the prior police misconduct is the most 
significant factor to be considered in deciding whether a 
subsequent consent was the result of police exploitation. The 
other factors identified in Arroyo for consideration of the 
exploitation question, temporal proximity and intervening 
circumstances between the police misconduct and the consent, are 
insignificant if the misconduct was not flagrant or purposeful. 
On the other hand, if the misconduct is egregious, the temporal 
proximity and intervening circumstances factors are dispositive. 
In the instant case, because there was no state or 
federal case on the books that would have made clear to the 
officers that their roadblock was unconstitutional, the police 
misconduct was not flagrant or purposeful. Therefore, it is 
insignificant that but a short period of time elapsed between the 
illegal stop and the consent and that no intervening 
-5-
circumstances were present. Under Thurman's clarification of 
Arroyo, defendant's voluntary consent was not obtained by police 
exploitation. Thus, the trial court correctly denied defendant's 
motion to suppress. His conviction should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE SEIZED PURSUANT TO DEFENDANT'S 
CONSENT TO SEARCH SHOULD NOT BE SUPPRESSED 
UNDER THE EXPLOITATION PRONG OF THE ARROYO 
TEST 
The order from the supreme court requires this Court to 
consider "the issue of whether there was sufficient attenuation 
between the illegal roadblock stop and a voluntary consent to 
search, so as to preclude the application of the fourth amendment 
exclusionary rule" (Appendix C). Defendant argues that his 
consent to the search of the car lacked attenuation from the 
initial, illegal roadblock stop2, and therefore the evidence 
seized was inadmissible under State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 
1990). In its pre-Arroyo ruling on defendant's motion to 
suppress, the trial court did not address the attenuation 
question because it held that the roadblock was legal (see 
Ruling, attached as Appendix A). The attenuation issue presents 
a question of law for this Court to decide de novo. State v. 
Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 26 (Utah Jan. 7, 1993). 
Defendant's argument fails because, in analyzing the 
attenuation question under Arroyo and Thurman. he does not fully 
2
 In defendant's original appeal to this Court, the State 
conceded that the roadblock violated the Fourth Amendment. 
Shoulderblade, slip op. at 3. 
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consider the supreme court's clarification of the exploitation 
prong of the test it adopted in Arroyo. Applying Thurman's 
clarification of the exploitation prong to this case, the 
evidence was lawfully seized from defendant's car pursuant to his 
consent. 
A. Clarification of Arroyo Test in Thurman 
In Arroyo, the court "held that a defendant's consent 
to a search following illegal police activity is valid under the 
Fourth Amendment only if both of the following tests are met: 
(i) The consent was given voluntarily, and (ii) the consent was 
not obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality." 
Thurman, 203 Utah Adv. Rep. at 20 (citing Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 
688). In Thurman, the court clarified how the exploitation 
(attenuation) prong of the Arroyo test is to be applied. 
The Thurman court began by stating that "Arroyo's 
primary goal was to deter the police from engaging in illegal 
conduct even though that conduct may be followed by a voluntary 
consent to the subsequent search." 203 Utah Adv. Rep. at 21. 
Having identified the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule 
as the basis for Arroyo's exploitation prong, the court 
reiterated the factors to be considered in assessing the validity 
of a consent to search that follows illegal police conduct: 
"[(1)] 'the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct,' 
[(2)] the 'temporal proximity' of the illegality and the consent, 
and [(3)] 'the presence of intervening circumstances.'" Ibid, 
(citations omitted). The court then discussed each factor, 
emphasizing the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule. 
-7-
The court made clear that the "purpose and flagrancy" 
factor is the most significant of the three because it "directly 
relates to the deterrent value of suppression." Ibid, (citations 
omitted). Therefore, the first task under the exploitation prong 
is to determine the nature and degree of the police illegality 
based on a continuum of "flagrancy" or "purpose." 
To put the continuum in perspective, it must first be 
recognized that "'[tjhe deterrent purpose of the exclusionary 
rule necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, 
or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived the 
defendant of some right.'11 .Id. at 22 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 
422 U.S. 590, 612 (Powell, J., concurring), in turn quoting 
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974)). Thus, at one end 
of the continuum is police misconduct that is "flagrantly 
abusive, [such that] there is greater likelihood that the police 
engaged in the conduct as a pretext for collateral objectives," 
or instances where "the purpose of the misconduct was to achieve 
the consent." Ibid, (citations omitted). In such cases, 
"suppressing the resulting evidence will have a greater 
likelihood of deterring similar misconduct in the future." Ibid, 
(citation and footnote omitted). 
At the other extreme are instances where "the police 
had no 'purpose' in engaging in the misconduct[•] [F]or example, 
if the illegality arose because [a court] later invalidated a 
statute on which the police had relied in good faith[,] 
suppression would have no deterrent value." Ibid, (citations 
omitted). 
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misconduct is extreme, we will require a 
clean break in the chain of events between 
the misconduct and the consent to find the 
consent valid. Conversely, where it 
appears that the illegality arose as the 
result of negligence, the lapse of time 
between the misconduct and the consent and 
the presence of intervening events become 
less critical to the dissipation of the 
taint. 
Ibid ( :: 1 ta ti ::)i i om :i I: ted) 
Thurman, s c3 a i: i fication of how the nature and degree of 
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Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990), and 
per se unconstitutional under article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution because there was no statutory authority for such a 
roadblock. 808 P.2d at 142, 145-50. Small simply held that the 
roadblock there was unconstitutional under Sitz; it did not reach 
the state constitutional question. 829 P.2d at 131 & n.2. 
In both Sims and Small, the defendants gave consent to 
a search of their vehicles after being stopped at police 
roadblocks which were later ruled illegal by this Court. At the 
time the roadblocks were set up, however, no decision from either 
the Utah appellate courts or the United States Supreme Court had 
directly ruled on the legality of such roadblocks. See generally 
Sims, 808 P.2d at 142-50. In fact, the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals had held that police roadblocks for the purpose of 
checking driver's license and vehicle registration were 
constitutional. United States v. Corral, 823 F.2d 1389, 1392 
(10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1054 (1988). It was not 
until Sitz and Sims were issued that it became clear the 
roadblocks at issue were unconstitutional under the Fourth 
Amendment and article I, section 14. Thus, the roadblocks could 
not fairly be characterized as flagrant violations of the federal 
or state constitutions. 
While it is not clear that the Sims panel actually 
concluded that the police misconduct was flagrant, it seemed to 
suggest that the roadblock constituted a flagrant constitutional 
violation because (1) "[t]he troopers each had years of law 
enforcement experience, and [could] properly be charged with 
-10-
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Jt" c'O'iiii ludini.'i that the defendant Of. "consent to search 
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roadblock, " Sims relied most heavily on Two factors: (I) "the 
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even under our clear erroi standard ot review ooulnl the trial 
cou^ ~ find enough time between the stop' mind the grant of consent 
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Given Arroyo's ambiguous discussion of the exploitation 
prong, it was not unreasonable for the Sims and Park panels to 
interpret Arroyo as requiring a clean break in the chain of 
events between a prior police illegality (whether or not 
flagrant) and the subsequent consent for the consent to be valid. 
However, Thurman clearly rejected the Sims/Park approach. 
Defendant's reliance on Sims and Small as controlling authority 
is therefore wrong. Insofar as Sims held that a consent search 
is automatically invalidated if the voluntary consent is closely 
connected in time and by circumstance to the prior police 
illegality, it is no longer good law. As Thurman makes clear, if 
the violation by the police is not flagrant or purposeful, 
temporal proximity or the absence of intervening circumstances 
between the illegality and the consent is not significant. 
B. The Instant Case 
Here, the roadblock was set up to check driver's 
licenses and vehicle registrations. Shoulderblade, slip op. at 
1; Small, 829 P.2d at 130. The officers were also instructed to 
further question anyone who looked suspicious. Ibid. Because 
Sitz and Sims had not been issued at the time of this roadblock, 
and the Tenth Circuit had upheld a driver's license/vehicle 
registration roadblock in United States v. Corral, the officers 
could not have reasonably known that their roadblock was 
unconstitutional. Therefore, the officers' activity could not be 
characterized as a flagrant or purposeful constitutional 
violation. This case is akin to one in which "the illegality 
arose because [a court] later invalidated a statute on which the 
-12-
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoi ng arguments, this Court should 
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RESPECTFULLY submitted this J__ day of April, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON (J 
Assistant Attorney General 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
******* 
STATE OF UTAH, ) Case Number 86-2413 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) RULING 





This matter came before the Court on the 4th day of 
August, 1989 on defendant's motion to suppress. The parties 
proffered certain testimony, a witness was called and testified, 
and counsel presented their arguments to the Court. The Court, 
having taken the matter under advisement, and having diligently 
considered all of the evidence before it, now enters this: 
RULING 
On September 29, 198B, the Utah Highway Patrol, in 
conjunction with the Millard County Sheriff's Office conducted a 
roadblock on a flat section of Interstate Highway 15, south of 
Fillmore. Notice of the checkpoint was duly given one week 
before in the local newspaper of general circulation. Prior to 
setting the roadblock, the officers were briefed and instructed 
to check for proper driver's license and vehicle registration. 
Appropriate signs were placed, announcing the checkpoint at some 
distance in front of the block. 
During the roadblock, all cars were stopped. Pursuant 
to the roadblock, defendants were stopped. During the stop, the 
officer present observed defendant Small shove s plastic bag 
between the front seats of the ear. The officer checked both 
defendants' identification and determined that the car was not 
registered to either defendant. While awaiting confirmation from 
dispatch regarding registration, the officer asked defendants 
whether there were any firearms, alcohol, or drugs in the car. 
The response was in the negative. The officer then requested 
permission to search the vehicle. Consent was given. 
As defendant Shoulderblade exited the car, the officer 
noticed a gun under the front seat. Subsequent search of the 
passenger compartment of the vehicle revealed a substantial 
quantity of drugs, drug paraphernalia, money, and loaded 
firearms. In the course of the search of the passenger 
compartment, the officer asked defendants if they knew anything 
about the firearms or the drugs. Defendants responded in the 
negative. They were subsequently arrested and were apprised of 
their rights before any further attempt at questioning. 
As the officer searched the passenger compartment of 
the vehicle, he smelled what he believed to be raw marijuana. He 
subsequently, opened the trunk and found more drugs and 
paraphernalia. 
The evidence presented indicates that the roadblock was 
properly instituted at a fixed point as indicated in Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979). The checkpoint was located in 
• flat area end was highly visible. By allowing officers to 
check licenses and vehicle registration, advanced a legitimate 
governmental purpose as required in United States v. McFavden. 
865 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
As further required in McFavden, there was no 
discretion on the part of officers stopping the cars—all were 
required to stop. While there is some caestion as to whether all 
of the large trucks were stopped at the roadblock, there was no 
clear testimony that they were not stopped. The court notes that 
the Tenth Circuit has ruled that letting certain vehicles through 
the roadblock unchecked is not, per se, an unlawful practice. 
United States v. Corral. 823 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir. 1987). In any 
event, it is undisputed that all passenger vehicles were stopped. 
Questioning as part of an initial stop does not 
normally rise to the level of a custodial interrogation. The 
Utah Supreme Court has held that Miranda warnings are not 
required for investigation and interview pursuant to determining 
whether a crime has been committed. Salt Lake City v. earner, 
664 P.2d 1168, 1170 (Utah 1983). 
The factors required for a Miranda warning under earner 
are not present. Here questioning as to the contents of the car 
was made as the officer awaited information from the dispatcher 
relative to vehicle registration. Questioning made during the 
search of the vehicle was not accusatory. Any interrogation if 
it can be called that was brief and informal. See earner, at 
1171. The defendants were only detained after facts came to 
light during the check that created a reasonable suspicion that 
the occupants were engaged in some criminal activity (earner). 
The uncon trover ted testimony is that the defendants were properly 
advised of their rights before further attempts at questioning. 
All of the above factors» notice of the stop, its 
location, legitimate purpose of the stop, training of the 
officers, the minimal intrusion by the officers unless there was 
an articulateble and reasonable suspicion, establish a minimum 
of public inconvenience. 
Defendants gave permission to search the vehicle. 
Consent was never withdrawn. As such, the subsequent search of 
the trunk was reasonable and proper. Even if the consent was 
somehow defective, (and there is no evidence that this is the 
case) this court believes that due to the evidence found in the 
passenger compartment and the smell of marijuana, the officer had 
probable cause to search the trunk space. See State v. Earl, 716 
P.2d 603 (Utah 1986). 
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the 
vehicle stop, search, and subsequent arrest were properly 
administered. The Court therefore denies defendants' motion to 
suppress. 
DATED at Provo, Utah this 'g- t day of August, 1989. 
GEORGE W, BALLIF, JUDGE / 
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JACKSON, Judge: 
This is an appeal from a trial court's denial of appellant 
Dennis Shoulderblade's motion to suppress certain evidence that 
was obtained as a result of a roadblock and subsequent search of 
the vehicle he was driving. We affirm, 
Shoulderblade has not challenged the trial court's findings 
of fact on appeal* Therefore, we adopt the following facts. 
On September 29, 1988, the Utah Highway Patrol, in conjunction 
with the Millard County Sheriff's office, conducted a roadblock 
in Millard County, Utah, on a section of Interstate 15. 
Approximately fifteen officers were assigned to operate the 
roadblock. They were instructed to check for driver's licenses 
and vehicle registration. In addition, the officers were told to 
further question anyone who looked suspicious. 
During the roadblock, all vehicles were stopped, including 
the vehicle Shoulderblade was driving. Lemuel Small was a 
passenger in that vehicle. Officer Jeffrey Whatcott, who 
executed the stop, testified that both Small and Shoulderblade 
produced valid identification. The vehicle was not registered to 
either Small or Shoulderblade. Small told the officer that the 
vehicle belonged to a friend of his. The officer sought 
confirmation of registration through radio dispatch. He also 
asked Small and Shoulderblade if there were any firearms, 
alcohol, or drugs in the vehicle. Both replied in the negative. 
Officer Whatcott then requested permission to search the vehicle. 
Small consented. Both Small and Shoulderblade were arrested 
after a substantial quantity of drugs, drug paraphernalia, 
firearms, and cash was found in the vehicle. Officer Whatcott 
continued to search the vehicle, and upon smelling marijuana, 
opened the trunk of the vehicle and discovered more drugs and 
paraphernalia. 
Small and Shoulderblade were charged in an amended 
information with several counts of possession of controlled 
substances. Both defendants filed motions to suppress the 
evidence that was found in the vehicle. The motions were based 
on the alleged illegality of the roadblock. The trial court 
concluded that the roadblock was instituted in a lawful manner. 
The court further held that Miranda warnings were not required 
under the facts before it, and that any interrogation that took 
place was brief and informal. The uncontroverted testimony 
indicated that both Small and Shoulderblade were properly advised 
of their rights before further attempts at questioning them took 
place. 
The trial court made the following findings: Small and 
Shoulderblade consented to the search of the vehicle; the consent 
was never withdrawn; even if the consent were found to be somehow 
defective, there was probable cause to search the trunk of the 
vehicle. Based on the foregoing, the court denied the motions to 
suppress• 
Small and Shoulderblade were tried by a jury on February 16, 
1990. The jury convicted Small of one count of possession of a 
controlled substance (cocaine), a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. 5 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1988), and 
two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute (methamphetamine and marijuana), a second and a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) 
(Supp. 1988).l Shoulderblade appeals the trial court's denial of 
his motion to suppress the evidence found as a result of the 
search. 
Shoulderblade first asserts that the roadblock at which he 
was stopped violated his constitutional right against 
1. The current versions of the statutes under which Shoulderblade 
was convicted are codified at Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8 (Supp. 
1992). 
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unreasonable searches and seizures. The State concedes that the 
roadblock in question does not pass muster under the federal 
constitution, and therefore we reverse the trial court's 
determination that the roadblock was conducted in a legal manner. 
Shoulderblade did not argue before the trial court, or 
before this court, that the consent given to search the vehicle 
was involuntary, or that it was insufficiently attenuated from 
the illegal roadblock to justify the search. As the State points 
out, while a nonattenuation argument was unavailable to 
Shoulderblade in the trial court, because, as acknowledged in 
State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 150 (Utah App. 1991), cert, pending, 
"then-standing decisions effectively held that a non-coerced 
search consent, by itself, purged the taint of a primary 
illegality," id. at 150, the argument was available when this 
case was briefed for appeal. However, Shoulderblade has failed 
to articulate such an argument before this court. 
Therefore, in light of the trial courts uncontested finding 
that consent was given to search the vehicle, we affirm the trial 
900288-CA n 
court's denial of Shoulderblade^s motion to suppress on the 
ground that the challena^d pviriAirA WAR obtained during a valid 
consent search.2 
Norman H. Jacksoi^Oudge ^ 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
2. Shoulderblade also asserts because the evidence was seized as 
a result of interrogations which violated his right against self-
incrimination, the evidence is inadmissible. Nothing in his 
statement of facts, however, comes close to describing any 
interrogation that might have taken place, or what, if any 
incriminating statements were obtained therefrom. Further, 
the trial court found that the questioning that took place during 
the search of the vehicle was Mnot accusatory,* and that the 
uncontroverted testimony indicated that Shoulderblade was advised 
of his constitutional rights following his arrest. Shoulderblade 
has not cited us to anywhere in the record that disputes this 
finding. 
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APPENDIX C 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Dennis Shoulderblade, 
Defendant and Petitioner. 
Supreme Court No. 920239 
ORDER 
Defendant's motion to summarily reverse the Court of 
Appeal's decision in this case is granted, and the case is 
remanded to that court for further proceedings. 
The Court of Appeals is directed to invite the 
parties to brief the issue of whether there was sufficient 
attenuation between the illegal roadblock stop and a 
voluntary consent to search, so as to preclude the 
application of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule, and to 
issue its ruling on the attenuation question. 
Dated this fifth day of January, 1993. 
BY THE COURT 
Gordon R. Hall 
Chief Justice 
